


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The Limits of Expertise: Rethinking Pilot Error and the Causes of Airline Accidents (Ashgate Studies in Human Factors for Flight Operations)

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R. Key Dismukes, Benjamin A. Berman, Loukia D. : The Limits of Expertise: Rethinking Pilot Error and the Causes of Airline Accidents (Ashgate Studies in Human Factors for Flight Operations) before purchasing it in order to gage whether or not it would be worth my time, and all praised The Limits of Expertise: Rethinking Pilot Error and the Causes of Airline Accidents (Ashgate Studies in Human Factors for Flight Operations):

1 of 1 people found the following review helpful. Great Companion for Crew Resource Management CoursesBy Todd P. HubbardHaving listened to research paper presentations by the authors of this wonderful book, I knew that the scholarship in *The Limits of Expertise* would be top notch. And so it is. The authors introduce their readers to much more than NTSB reviews of airplane accidents. They go beyond NTSB summaries that often stop at indicating a failure of the airplane or the pilot. They embrace a systems approach to the examination of causal factors in airplane accidents. I highly recommend this text as a companion text for Crew Resource Management courses, as did Key Dismukes when I talked to him about its use. I've used "Limits" in every CRM course I've taught since the text was published. My students have really enjoyed it, and the chapters lend themselves well to presentations.0 of 0 people found the following review helpful. Good BookBy Ashraf AbushanabFantastic book for anyone in the field. As an airline pilot, this is one of the books that I enjoyed and benefited from.6 of 7 people found the following review helpful. A good answer that should continueBy Cliente KindleWhen someone reviews statistical information about human factors in air accidents, it is very easy to find that under the label "human factors" there are many different and heterogeneous things.The real way to know what is the importance of human factors is an in-depth analysis of many accidents without accepting the generic "human factors" as an explanation. That is exactly what authors make with several accidents explaining beyond NTSB analysis why crew behaved in a way that, finally, drove to an accident.The book shows a model of analysis and that is very useful for investigators or air safety experts in general. However, the application of that kind of analysis to many other accidents -all of them, if possible, instead of a few ones- should be extremely useful not only to avoid new accidents but to design new planes, new SOPs and new training models.The conclusion we could extract is as follows: At this moment, we are not extracting all the possible knowledge from an accident. The book explains how to go further.

The Limits of Expertise reports a study of the 19 major U.S. airline accidents from 1991-2000 in which the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) found crew error to be a causal factor. Each accident is reported in a separate chapter that examines events and crew actions and explores the cognitive processes in play at each step.

'The authors do not, however, argue that human error is just part of the price of doing business - it must still be reduced, and to be reduced, the factors associated with it must be understood as well as possible, which is the aim of their study.' *AeroSafety World*, May 2007 'Overall, this is an excellent and innovative text which reflects the authors' original approach to airline safety. The book is outstanding in its identification of common themes that run deeper than in previous analyses of aviation safety, and the final chapter contains clear, pragmatic guidance to the air transport and to researchers. In the final sections of the book, the authors sum up the central challenge faced by the industry in reducing vulnerability to error: pilots should be given more information, better interfaces and clearer decision-making guidance - backed up by prioritizing adherence to that guidance over commercial pressures such as on-time performance. The book will be informative for diverse readers in the air transport industry, including operational staff, researchers, safety analysts, accident investigators, designers of systems and procedures, training providers and students.' --Ben Daley, Manchester Metropolitan University - Submitted to .com'*The Limits of Expertise* challenges how we think about accidents and pilot error. From details of recent accidents, the authors argue that while pilot error is often concluded as cause, we should expect many operators similarly situated to make comparable decisions and take equivalent actions. From that perspective, individual actions and errors are not the source of accidents but a result of systemic causes. This reframing provides good news - managers and regulators can act at system levels to prevent many future accidents.' Tom Chidester, Civil Aerospace Medical Institute, USA 'This is not a Michael Crichton thriller, but those familiar with aviation will easily be able to follow the details as they are stated in factual, non-judgmental manner, and will see into the deep causes of the events that led up to the final accident. Readers who are already familiar with aviation terminology will find the book easy to read (do you know what "LOFT" and "windshear" mean?). At the end, the very helpful glossary covers both aviation and cognitive psychology terms so that readers of all levels of industry expertise or interest can enjoy this useful study.' *Association for Aviation Psychology Newsletter*, Sept 07 'The book is likely to be of interest to several audiences. Certain chapters may be excellent accompanying material for introductory or advanced Human Factors courses. Also, many human factors and safety professionals may find reading the book rewarding - the reports are well written and clear, even for people without aviation background. Technical concepts are explained in a glossary at the end of the book. The concluding chapter provides some insights and analyses, even though it does not constitute (and probably does not aim to be) a major theoretical proposition. Perhaps the most important aspect of the book, which makes it valuable reading for human factors professionals, is the very realistic depiction of actual operations in a complex environment. Rarely does one have the opportunity to obtain such close looks at the reasoning and actions of highly skilled professionals, such as airline crews.' --*Human Factors Ergonomics Newsletter*, no2/2007'I strongly endorse this text as a companion to the primary texts used in courses in Human Factors in Aviation or Crew Resource Management. As I prepared my syllabus for an upcoming CRM course, I found this text, reviewed it and then added it as a supplementary text to my primary CRM texthellip;Key Dismukes hellip;said that he and the other authors had intended their text to be used in

this unique way.' Todd P. Hubbard, International Journal of Professional Aviation Training Testing Research 'It's usefulness and appeal may seem to be limited to those in aviation industries, but this is not the case. It is valuable to safety practitioners and theorists in general, particularly those in the field of human factors, and the management lessons that it draws from its many accident studies are instructive to managers in all sectors' Safety Critical Systems Club Newsletter 'The authors argue that human error should be seen as an indication of "system vulnerability" rather than pilot inadequacy. Fortunately there are many ways in which managers and regulators can improve the system to help avoid future accidents. The book is packed with techniques by which individual pilots can reduce their vulnerability to error and thereby improve their chances of reaching retirement unscathed. A fascinating read for pilots, managers, regulators and anyone interested in operations at the limits of human expertise.' The Log, BALPA, 2008 'It is not often that one finds a book that so admirably combines scientific theory and practical operations analysis. The authors do so with insight and integrity, and both professionals and the general public would be well served if more books such as this were available.' --Ergonomics in Design, Spring 2008

About the Author
Dr Dismukes is Chief Scientist for Human Factors in the Human Factors Research Technology Division at NASA Ames Research Center. His current research addresses cognitive issues involved in the skilled performance of pilots, their ability to manage challenging situations, and their vulnerability to error; prospective memory; and management of attention in concurrent task performance. Captain Berman is a senior research associate at San Jose State University/NASA Ames Research Center and flies the Boeing 737 for a major air carrier. He is the former Chief of Major Investigations of the U.S. National Transportation Board, where he previously led the Operational Factors Division, served as a member of the major accident go-team responsible for flight operations, and managed safety studies. Dr Loukopoulos is a Senior Research Associate at NASA's Human Factors Research and Technology Division. She currently resides in Athens, Greece where she serves as a human factors consultant to the Greek Air Accident Investigation and Safety Board and where she served on the Helios Airways 2005 accident investigation. She also continues her collaboration with NASA through the San Jose State University Foundation.